ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—THE HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLUSION CLARIFICATION: 42 U.S.C. SECTION 6921(i): DID CONGRESS INTEND TO EXCLUDE MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ASH FROM REGULATION AS HAZARDOUS WASTE UNDER SUBTITLE C? by Warner, Jane E.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 16 16 (1994)




CLARIFICATION: 42 U.S.C. SECTION 6921(i):
DID CONGRESS INTEND TO EXCLUDE
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ASH FROM
REGULATION AS HAZARDOUS WASTE
UNDER SUBTITLE C?
Jane E. Warner
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jane E. Warner, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—THE HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLUSION CLARIFICATION: 42 U.S.C. SECTION
6921(i): DID CONGRESS INTEND TO EXCLUDE MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ASH FROM REGULATION AS HAZARDOUS
WASTE UNDER SUBTITLE C?, 16 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 149 (1994), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/7
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLU­
SION CLARIFICATION; 42 U.S.c. SECTION 6921(i): DID CONGRESS 
INTEND TO EXCLUDE MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ASH FROM REGU­
LATION As HAZARDOUS WASTE UNDER SUBTITLE C? 
INTRODUCTION 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Actl ("RCRA") 
was enacted to regulate daily management of hazardous and non­
hazardous solid wastes, to protect human health and the environ­
ment, and to conserve depleting energy resources through recov­
ery.2 Under Subtitle C of RCRA, Congress authorized the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate regula­
tions3 subjecting hazardous wastes to a strict "cradle-to-grave 
regulatory regime."4 The EPA's response to this congressional au­
thorization, which left the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts in 
conflict regarding the interpretation of RCRA's "Household 
Waste" exemption, is the subject of this Note.5 
Pursuant to congressional authorization, the EPA excluded 
municipal "household waste" from Subtitle C regulation.6 This 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Resource Conservation 
.and Recovery Act of 1976. RCRA has become the preferred acronym for the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act. RCRA is, in reality, a set of amendments designed to augment 
existing solid waste disposal legislation. See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: 
The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 
ENVTL. L. REp. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254 (May, 1991). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 6902 (1988). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6925 (1988). 
4. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. 
5. See infra notes 14-15. 
6. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,120 (1980) (codified as amended at 40 CFR § 261.4(b)(1) 
(1992». The regulation provides: 

§ 261.4 Exclusions 

(b) Solid wastes which are not hazardous wastes. The following solid wastes 
are not hazardous wastes: 
(1) Household waste, including household waste that has been collected, 
transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g., refuse-derived fuel) or 
reused. "Household waste" means any waste material (including garbage, 
trash and sanitary wastes in septic tanks) derived from households (including 
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EPA exclusion classified "household waste" as waste that "has been 
collected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered ... or 
reused."7 The EPA regulations have never clearly expressed 
whether municipal waste ash which collects at the bottom of an in­
cinerator after incineration ("bottom ash") is excluded from Subti­
tle C regulation as "household waste" or, if the ash exhibits 
hazardous waste characteristics, whether the ash should be regu­
lated as a hazardous waste.S In section 3001(i) of the 1984 RCRA 
amendments,9 Congress clarified and expanded the "household 
waste" exclusion without addressing whether waste ash was specifi­
cally included as "household waste" or excluded as a hazardous 
waste. The codification of section 3001(i) essentially provided that 
a resource recovery facility which burned municipal solid waste was 
excluded from the hazardous waste regulation requirements of 
"treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing" hazardous 
waste.10 
Following the RCRA amendments and because Congress did 
not clarify a per se ash exclusion, the EPA issued several conflicting 
interpretations of the "household waste" exclusion with respect to 
the bottom ash produced as a result of the waste management in­
7. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,120 (1980). 
8. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,098 (1980). The EPA excluded ash in the preamble to its haz­
ardous waste regulations stating: "[s]ince household waste is excluded in all phases of 
its management, residues remaining after treatment (e.g., incineration ...) are not sub­
ject to regulation as hazardous waste." Id. at 33,085 (Preamble). But see infra notes 
58-63 and accompanying text for subsequent conflicting EPA positions on whether or 
not to exclude ash from hazardous waste regulation. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988). This is the codified amendment to RCRA, origi­
nally section 3001(i); see infra note 10 for the full text of the clarification. 
10. The codification of section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C § 6921(i) provides: 

Clarification of Household Waste Exclusion 

A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass burning of mu­

nicipal solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or 
otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the purpose of regulation under this 
subchapter, if ­
(1) such facility ­
(A) receives and burns only ­
(i) household waste (from single and mUltiple dwellings, hotels, 
motels, and other residential sources), and 
(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not 
contain hazardous waste identified or listed under this section, and 
(B) does not accept hazardous waste ... , and 
(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established contractual require­
ments or other appropriate notification or inspection procedures to assure that 
hazardous wastes are not received at or burned in such facility. 
42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988). 
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cineration process.!1 It remained unclear whether bottom ash 
which exhibited hazardous waste characteristics should be regu­
lated as a hazardous waste under the RCRA Subtitle C regulation 
or whether Congress intended to exempt it from the category of 
hazardous waste. 
This confusion concerning classification of waste ash as hazard­
ous or household waste crystallized in two recent circuit court 
cases12 which construed RCRA section 3001(i). Both cases ad­
dressed whether the clarification of the "household waste" exemp­
tion did, in fact, clarify whether municipal bottom waste ash is 
within the exemption.13 
This Note contrasts the Second Circuit's holding in Environ
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. 14 and 
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. City of Chicag0 15 in an attempt to determine whether Congress 
intended to exempt municipal waste bottom ash from regulation as 
a hazardous waste, despite its hazardous propensities.16 Section I of 
11. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,098, 33,099 (1980); see also supra note 5. But see infra notes 
58-63 and accompanying text for conflicting EPA positions on whether or not to ex­
clude ash from hazardous waste regulation. 
12. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 F. 
Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 
(1991); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. 
III. 1989), rev'd, 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992), affd on 
rem.,985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). 
13. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
14. 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Environmental Defense Fund will be 
referred to as "EDF"]. 
15. 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991). 
16. See Kathleen J. Rutt, Note, Regulating the Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste 
Incinerator Ash: The Companion Cases of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Whee­
labrator Technologies, Inc. and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 4 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 207 (1993) for thorough factual recitation of the cases and brief anal­
ysis of these cases analogizing the ash problem to CERCLA problems of clean-up of 
hazardous contamination. Ms. Rutt's Note concludes that the Seventh Circuit in Chi
cago reached the correct conclusion that ash was intended to be exempt from hazard­
ous waste regulation in the circumstances of the case. This Note reaches the opposite 
conclusion and bases its analysis on statutory construction principles rather than on 
policy considerations. See also David C. Wartinbee, Ph.D., Comment, Incinerator Ash 
May Not Be A Hazardous Waste, But The Story Doesn't End There!, 9 COOLEY L. REV. 
115 (1992) which concludes that the debate over municipal incineration ash disposal 
may be a waste of time because the penalties a polluter incurs as a result of CERCLA 
liability include reclamation of any polluted area. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mur­
tha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991). However, an argument still needs to be made for 
any regulation that will prevent pollution in the first place. Clean-up costs thousands, 
even millions of dollars, and it can take years to revitalize a polluted area. See, John 
Holusha, Ruling on Ash May Increase Some Cities' Disposal Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 1991, at Dl; Solid Waste: Hazardous or Not Interest Groups Want Incinerator Ash 
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this Note outlines the development of the "household waste" ex­
emption within RCRA and its 1984 clarification amendment. Sec­
tion II examines the Second Circuit's Wheelabrator case, which held 
that municipal ash was exempt from hazardous waste regulation as 
a household waste. Section III reviews the Seventh Circuit's deci­
sion in Chicago, which held that municipal ash was within the pur­
view of hazardous waste regulation. Section IV analyzes and 
contrasts these holdings and analyzes the Supreme Court's views on 
the use of legislative history in statutory constructionP Finally, this 
Note concludes that the Wheelabrator court properly construed the 
"household waste" exemption by interpreting the ambiguous statu­
tory language of section 3001(i) within the parameters set by the 
Supreme Court.1S 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. RCRA Subtitles C and D 
RCRA and the EPA regulations promulgated thereunder con­
stitute a comprehensive scheme of environmental legislation. This 
scheme· divides solid waste into two classes for disposal purposes 
and classifies waste as either hazardous or non-hazardous. The first 
step in classification is to determine whether a substance, in this 
case waste ash, is considered a solid waste.19 In 1980, the EPA 
promulgated, pursuant to congressional authorization, several regu­
lations which defined "solid waste" and "other waste material." 
The EPA defined solid waste as any "garbage, refuse, sludge" or 
any "other waste material" not otherwise exempted.20 The EPA 
clarified the phrase "other waste material" to be material that has 
Legislation From Congress, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1650 (Jan. 26, 1990). Therefore, it is 
imperative that municipal ash be determined hazardous or benign for purposes of dis­
posal so that municipalities can either get on with the development of incineration as a 
viable energy recovery source or abandon it. See also Bradley K. Groff, Note, Burned­
If-We-Do, Burned-If-We-Don't: Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste Incinerator Ash 
Under RCRA's Household Waste Exclusion, 27 GEO. L. REV. 555 (1993) for a discus­
sion of the use of legislative history and policy issues in statutory construction of 
RCRA's section 3001(i). 
17. This Note does not analyze policy or argue that policy is irrelevant to the 
general issue of whether the need for municipal incineration outweighs the need for 
environmental protection in municipal incineration circumstances. See supra note 16 
for references which discuss exclusion of bottom ash based on policy considerations; see 
also infra note 130. 
18. See supra note 1; see also infra notes 131-86. 
19. 40 C.F.R. pt. 260, app. I (1992). 
20. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,093 (1980). 
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"served its originally intended use and sometimes is discarded. "21 
Because of the continued confusion over when a material is some­
times discarded, in 1985 the EPA ultimately promulgated a straight­
forward definition of solid waste which provided that any 
"abandoned, recycled" or "inherently waste-like" material is dis­
carded material, regardless of the method of disposal. 22 Therefore, 
because municipal ash must be discarded or abandoned as a last 
step in the waste management process, it is disposed-of material 
and subject to regulation as a solid waste.23 
Once a substance is found to be a solid waste, the next step in 
regulation is to determine if the solid waste is hazardous.24 Subtitle 
C of RCRA strictly regulates hazardous solid wastes that are either 
"listed" or "characteristic" wastes.25 This is a two-step process. 
First, RCRA requires the EPA to "develop and promulgate criteria 
for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing 
hazardous waste ...."26 Second, the statute requires the EPA to 
promulgate regulations based on the criteria identifying the waste 
as "characteristic" or "listed" hazardous wastes.27 "Characteristic" 
21. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1981) (superseded by 50 Fed. Reg. 641 (January 4, 1985». 
See infra note 22 for the text of the subsequent definition of "discarded material." 
22. 50 Fed. Reg. 627 (1985). This regulation reiterated the statutory definition of 
solid waste as any "discarded material not otherwise excluded by regulation or by a 
variance." Id. Statutory regulations further define "discarded material" as that "aban­
doned," "recycled" or "inherently waste-like." See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(i)-(iii) (1992). 
Any "abandoned" material includes solid wastes "disposed of," "burned" or "inciner­
ated" or "[a]ccumulated, stored, or treated ... before or in lieu of being abandoned." 
See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i) and (b)(1)-(3) (1992). 
23. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 
American Mining, the question was whether the EPA definition of solid waste had im­
properly subjected to regulation as a solid waste American Mining material which was 
secondary, recovered material, captured and reinserted into the metal smelting process 
as an ongoing part of production. Id. at 1179, 1181. The court held that the EPA ex­
ceeded congressional intent to regulate "discarded material" in regulating secondary, 
reused material. Id. at 1186. The EPA interpreted the holding narrowly and excluded 
only those secondary materials that were recovered and reused. If any recycled mate­
rial is discarded, i.e., disposed of, it is not excluded from solid waste regulation. 53 Fed. 
Reg. 519-21, 523, 526 (1988). This ruling was subsequently validated by the court in 
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
24. 40 C.F.R. pt. 260, app. I (1992). See Hilary A. Sale, Note, Trash, Ash and 
Interpretation of RCRA, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 421-25 (1993) for a thorough 
discussion of when ash is considered toxic and for some of the EDF's data that sup­
ported its arguments that ash should be hazardous waste. 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (Supp. IV 1992). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The criteria should be formulated "tak­
ing into account toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumu­
lation in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other 
hazardous characteristics." Id. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (Supp. IV 1992). These regulations indicate characteristic 
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wastes are those that meet an "inherent property" test as set forth 
in EPA regulations.28 These inherent property regulations provide 
that if, after testing, a waste is either ignitable, reactive, corrosive or 
toxic, it can be classified as a "characteristic" waste.29 Most "char­
acteristic" wastes are classified due to their toxicity. Consequently, 
the EPA set forth a comprehensive detailed procedure for deter­
mining if a waste has a toxic characteristic.30 
"Listed" hazardous wastes are those that may exhibit toxic, ig­
nitable, corrosive or reactive characteristics or that are automati­
cally considered hazardous for other reasons.31 "Listed" hazardous 
wastes are divided into four groups.32 These groups are spent 
chemicals and by-products of various industrial processes,33 sludges 
and by-products of an entire single industry,34 and two categories 
including commercial chemicals and pesticides when discarded or 
spilled.35 EPA regulations establish the following three criteria to 
determine whether wastes are "listed" hazardous wastes: (1) wastes 
exhibiting one of the toxic characteristics of ignitablity, reactivity, 
corrosiveness or toxicity;36 (2) wastes fatal in low doses;37 or (3) 
wastes exhibiting RCRA properties posing "a substantial present 
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when im­
properly ... managed."38 
A waste is further classified as either a "characteristic" or 
"listed" waste based on EPA "mixture and derived from" rules 
wastes are those that meet an "inherent property" test in one of four ways: ignitability, 
reactivity, corrosivity and toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1989). See supra note 22 
and accompanying text. 
28. 42 U.S.c. § 6921(b) (Supp. IV 1992); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1992). 
29. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1992). 
30. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,987 (1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, app. II (1992)). A 
non-liquid waste is subject to a leaching procedure which extracts toxic material from 
the waste and tests its level of toxicity against established EPA guidelines. Id. If the 
waste exceeds 100 times the maximum contaminant level set under the Safe Water 
Drinking Act or other appropriate safety legislation for that material, it is considered 
hazardous. See 42 U.S.C. § 30Of-3 (1988); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 33,111 (1980); 55 Fed. 
Reg. 11,827 (1990). 
31. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11 (1992). 
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.11. 
33. 40 C.F.R. § 261.31 (1992); "f-listed," "nonspecific source" wastes of which 
there are 39 as of 1992. 
34. 40 C.F.R. § 261.32 (1992); "k-listed," "specific source" wastes of which there 
are almost 100 listed. 
35. 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (1992); "P" or "U" wastes which include over 250 products 
or residues. 
36. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(1) (1992); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20 -.24 (1992). 
37. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(2) (1992). 
38. 40 C.F.R. § 261.11(a)(3) (1992). 
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which address disposed of mixtures and the waste derived there­
from.39 A material will be classified as hazardous if, although an 
essentially non-hazardous "mixture" upon disposal, the residue 
"derived" from the "mixture" after disposal exhibits hazardous 
characteristics.40 The residue remains a hazardous waste as long as 
it exhibits the hazardous characteristic.41 
A major problem in characterizing or listing municipal ash as a 
hazardous waste arises from the nature of the ash itself. Although 
municipal wastes are themselves non-hazardous, once incinerated 
they may produce a toxic ash and would intermittently fail EPA 
toxicity tests.42 A facility may take in essentially the same non-haz­
ardous household wastes time and time again and never know 
which residue, if any, will test above the EPA toxicity limits. 
If a facility is classified as a hazardous waste disposal facility by 
the EPA, the only way a material disposed of by the facility escapes 
Subtitle C regulation is if the facility petitions the EPA for "delist­
ing" and shows the EPA that the material being disposed of is not, 
in fact, hazardous.43 Facilities seeking delisting must establish that 
(1) wastes do not fall within the "characteristic" classification, and 
(2) wastes do not exhibit any other characteristic that would cause 
the EPA to keep them "listed."44 In general, only materials with 
hazardous propensities below EPA testing levels are "delisted." 
Notwithstanding this delisting procedure, the EPA has "declas­
sified" certain solid wastes from Subtitle C regulation.45 These 
wastes are "declassified" despite their hazardous characteristics 
which place them over the EPA testing limits and otherwise would 
require regulation under RCRA Subtitle C. One important exc1u­
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii-iv) (1992). Although a "mixture and derived 
from" rule is not specifically stated in the regulation, the EPA discussed the rule in the 
preamble to the 1980 regulations. See infra note 58. 
40. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2) (1992). 
41. Id. 
42. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (app. II) (1992). The EPA toxicity test is a measure of 
the hazardous characteristics of a given solid waste. See AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp. 
v. EPA, 846 F.2d 158, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (stating waste is subject to 
regulation as hazardous waste where it fails the EPA toxicity test). 
43. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22 (1992). 
44. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22(a)(1)-(2) (1992). See also supra notes 28-38 for other EPA 
regulations pertaining to the discussion on classifying waste as "characteristic" or 
"listed." The next step in testing requires the material to be subjected to the vertical 
and horizontal model of groundwater transport to determine if the material will be 
problematic. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,896 (1985). The material is tested for the amount of dilu­
tion and attenuation that will occur after disposal in an unlined landfill. Id. 
45. 40 C.F.R. § 261 (app. IX) (1992). 
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sion from regulation under Subtitle C exempts "household wastes," 
or municipal waste being burned in energy recovery facilities.46 Be­
cause Congress indicated that incineration would cease to develop 
as a viable energy recovery method if municipalities' "household 
wastes" were subject to the strict Subtitle C regime, the EPA fur­
ther declassified certain hazardous solid wastes.47 Consequently, 
"household waste" is currently regulated under the less stringent 
standards of Subtitle D of RCRA.48 
B. The "Household Waste" Exclusion49 
The EPA issued Subtitle C regulations in three phases.5o Sec­
tion 261.4 of the May 1980 regulations provided that "household 
wastes," unless mixed with other hazardous wastes, would be 
deemed non-hazardous wastes.51 "Household waste" means "any 
waste material (including garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in sep­
tic tanks) derived from households."52 The preamble to the 1980 
regulations stated that "household waste," as a waste stream, was 
excluded in all phases of its management. Thus, residue remaining 
after incineration, because it is a part of the overall management 
process, is part of the waste stream and part of the exclusion.53 
In 1984, Congress clarified the "household waste" exclusion in 
section 3001(i}.54 Congress made general reference to "household 
46. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992). See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
47. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 6901-6902 (Supp. IV 1992). 
48. 42 U.S.c. § 6941-6949a (1988). See supra note 6. Subtitle D's less stringent 
standards merely forbid disposing of solid wastes in open dumps and have not been the 
focus of any significant EPA regulations since the 1976 passage of RCRA. In 1989, as 
part of clean air legislation and RCRA reauthorization, reports recommended specific 
ash regulations, but these recommendations were not incorporated into legislation. See 
Ash Management and Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 306,104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
For a further discussion of Subtitle D which focusses on recycling and operation of state 
landfills, see Sale, supra note 24, at 414. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988). 
50. See Illinois v. Costle, 9 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,243 (D.D.C. 1979), 
affd sub nom. Citizens For a Better Env't. v. Costle, 617 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 42 
U.S.c. § 6972(a)(1) (1988). The EPA then issued Subtitle C regulations in three phases: 
45 Fed. Reg. 12,722 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066-259 (1980); and 47 Fed. Reg. 32,274 
(1982). See also 47 Fed. Reg. 32,276-277 (1982) (listing all initial Subtitle C regulation's 
published dates). 
51. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992). See supra note 6 for the text ofthe regulation. 
52. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992). See supra note 6 for the text of the "house­
hold waste" exclusion. 
53. Id. The EPA further explained that if household waste was mixed with haz­
ardous wastes, the mixture would be "deemed hazardous" and would be regulated 
under Subtitle C. Id. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988). See supra note 10 for the text of the clarification. 
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wastes," without specifically addressing municipal ash regulation.55 
In 1985 the EPA promulgated a regulation identical to the language 
of section 3001(i).56 The preamble to that EPA regulation acknowl­
edges the existence of toxic ash and interprets the "household 
wastes" statute to exclude municipal ash only where toxic charac­
teristics are rarely found in ash residue.57 This left open the possi­
ble inclusion of toxic ash as a Subtitle C waste. This possible 
interpretation conflicted with the EPA's earlier interpretation that 
ash as part of the waste stream is a household waste and therefore 
exempt from regulation as a hazardous waste.58 However, the EPA 
further announced its intention not to consider the matter until seri­
ous questions arose about the ash. The EPA's position apparently 
stemmed from concern for the "highly beneficial nature of resource 
recovery facilities" as expressed by Congress in its RCRA state­
ment of purposes.59 
In 1987, the EPA appeared to be changing its position. The 
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emer­
gency Response, J. Winston Porter, testified before the Senate Sub­
committee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substances.6o In 
response to a question on the status of incinerator ash, Porter con­
ceded that the EPA "may have been in error."61 Porter testified 
that the EPA interpretation of the household waste clarification 
was that Congress "probably intended to exclude these residues 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
56. 40 c.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1992); 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (1985). See supra note 
10 for the text of § 3001(i) clarification of the "household waste" exclusion. 
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (1985). 
58. Id. The preamble states: 
The statute is silent as to whether hazardous residues from burning combined 
household and non-household waste are hazardous waste. These residues 
would be hazardous wastes under present EPA regulations if they exhibited a 
characteristic. The legislative history does not directly address this question 
although the Senate report can be read as enunciating a general policy of non­
regulation of these resource recovery facilities if they carefully scrutinize their 
incoming wastes. On the other hand, residues from burning could, in theory, 
exhibit a characteristic of hazardous waste even if no hazardous waste is 
burned . . . . EPA does not see ... an intent to exempt the regulation of 
incinerator ash from the burning of non-hazardous waste in resource recovery 
facilities if the ash routinely exhibits a characteristic of hazardous waste. 
Id. 
59. Id. at 28,726. 
60. Regulations of Municipal Solid Waste Incinerators: Hearings on H.R. 2162 
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings] 
(statement of Thomas A. Luken, Chairman). 
61. Id. 
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from regulation under Subtitle C."62 
Only months later, the EPA appeared again to reverse itself. 
In May of 1988, Sylvia Lowrance, Director of the EPA Office of 
Solid Waste, testified before the same Senate Subcommittee and 
restated the EPA's 1985 position that if ash exhibits hazardous char­
acteristics, it would be regulated as hazardous waste.63 . 
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments imposed a two year 
moratorium on municipal solid waste incineration ash regulation.64 
Despite the existence of a proposed bill which would have specifi­
cally regulated ash under Subtitle D of RCRA, Congress expressly 
put the ash regulation problem on hold until it reauthorized RCRA 
during the 102nd Congress, a step it has yet to take.65 However, 
Congress also expressly stated that the moratorium would not "af­
fect in any manner ongoing litigation," including the two cases con­
trasted in this Note.66 . 
62. S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1983). Porter concluded that the 
primary intent of § 3001(i) was to encourage energy recovery and that the EPA's previ­
ous interpretation would be inconsistent with the exclusion where Congress had ex­
pressly stated "all waste management activities of a facility" were to be included. Id. 
63. Id. at 33. 
64. Pub. L. No. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399 (1990). Congress decided to maintain the 
status quo on ash regulation despite the existence of a proposed bill which would have 
specifically regulated ash under Subtitle D of RCRA. Representative Thomas A. 
Luken, in his opening remarks at the hearing on the proposed legislation, recognized 
the ambiguity of the current statutory language as to whether Subtitle C or D should 
regulate ash. Hearings, supra note 60. Representative Luken further recognized the 
conflicting signals sent by the EPA and called for legislative action. Id. Although it is 
not entirely clear why Congress did not act on this bill, it could be argued that Congress 
was awaiting judicial decision on the two cases contrasted in this Note. Judicial resolu­
tion of any dispute between the circuits could focus the scope of further legislation. 
Should the Supreme Court take a position inconsistent with congressional intent, then 
Congress would act to make the language of the "household waste" exemption clearer. 
If Congress is satisfied with the outcome, it need not act further. 
65. See Stephen Johnson, Recyclable Materials and RCRA's Complicated, Con­
flicting, and Costly Definition ofSolid Waste, 21 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,357, 
10,358 n.10 (July, 1991). In the first three weeks of the first session of the 102nd Con­
gress, over 11 amendments or reauthorization bills were introduced. Id. See also supra 
note 64. 
66. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931 
F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 448 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 486 
(1992), affd on rem., 985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). Both 
Wheelabrator and Chicago appeals were pending at the time of the 1990 Clean Air 
Amendments. The House and Senate Conferees expressly stated: "[t]he Conferees do 
not intend to prejudice or affect in any manner ongoing litigation, including Environ­
mental Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 758 (2d Cir.) [sic] and Envi­
ronmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago, Appeal No. 90-3060 (7th Cir.) [sic] or any 
state activity regarding ash." Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213 (quoting H.R. CONF. No. 
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC V. WHEELABRATOR 
TECHNOLOGIE~ INC 67 
The defendant in Wheelabrator, Wheelabrator Technologies, 
Inc. ("Wheelabrator"), operates a resource recovery facility which 
produces ash residue as a result of incinerating the trash of West­
chester County, New York.68 Prior to the commencement of the 
suit against Wheelabrator, nine out of ten bottom ash samples 
taken from the incinerator failed the EPA toxicity test technically 
rendering the samples hazardous materia1.69 The Environmental 
Defense Fund ("EDF") contended that this ash was hazardous 
waste subject to RCRA Subtitle c.70 Wheelabrator contended that 
the ash fell within RCRA's "household waste" exclusion and there­
fore could be disposed of via non-hazardous Subtitle D 
regulation.71 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York rejected EDF's arguments, issued a memorandum of 
findings and conclusions and ordered further discovery. The dis­
trict court ultimately ordered judgment for Wheelabrator, exempt­
ing its ash from Subtitle C regulation.72 The EDF appealed the 
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis­
trict court's holding.73 The court of appeals found that Congress 
intended Wheelabrator's municipal ash residue to be excluded from 
hazardous waste regulation because ash was intended to be "house­
hold waste" as clarified under section 3001(i) of the 1984 amend­
ments to RCRA.74 
952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 335, 342, reprinted in 1990 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3874); see 
supra note 64. 
67. 725 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). 
68. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 212. 
69. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 761 n.6. The procedure used to test these sam­
ples is set out at Appendix II to 40 C.F.R. § 261.33. See also supra note 42 and accom­
panying text. 
70. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 212. See also 42 U.S.c. §§ 6921-6939b (1988). 
71. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 212. See also supra notes 6, 9 and 48. 
72. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213. The district court further dismissed EDF's 
complaint with prejudice which led to the appeal based on the findings and conclusions 
of the court's memorandum of November 21, 1989. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 770. 
73. Wheelabrator, 931 F.2d at 213-14. The Second Circuit stated: "[a]fter care­
fully reviewing Judge Haight's thorough and well reasoned opinion, we agree with his 
analysis of the legal issues. Accordingly, we affirm." [d. 
74. [d. at 213. 
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The court of appeals relied on the district court's reasoning in 
its opinion. The district court considered the substantive issues re­
lating to the creation and management of municipal ash residue as 
set out in RCRA section 3001(i).7s The court held that the section 
3001(i) exclusion extends to "residue ash produced by the incinera­
tion of municipal solid waste."76 
The district court read the language of the statute in light of its 
legislative history.77 The court construed the plain language of sec­
tion 3001(i) using the statute's definitions of "disposal," "hazardous 
waste generation" and "hazardous waste management."78 The term 
"disposal" is defined by the statute as "discharge, deposit, injection 
... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any 
land or water so that such ... waste ... may enter the environment 
or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters ...."79 
"Hazardous waste generation" means "the act or process of pro­
ducing hazardous waste."80 "Hazardous waste management" 
means "the systematic control of the collection, source separation, 
storage, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery and dispo­
sal of hazardous wastes. "81 
EDF argued that "managing" rather than "generating" hazard­
ous wastes was the focus of section 3001(i), rendering "generating" 
of the ash outside the purview of the exclusion.82 The court dis­
agreed. The court read the term "management" with the term "dis­
posal" to conclude that managing waste is not exclusive of 
generating waste because in managing waste, a facility must dispose 
of any residue that is generated.83 
The legislative history of section 3001(i) persuaded the district 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 F. 
Supp. 758, 764-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
453 (1991). 
78. [d. at 764; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3), (6), (7) (1988). See infra notes 79-81 
and accompanying text for the definitions of the statutory terms relied on by the Second 
Circuit. 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988); Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 n.13. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(6) (1988); Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 n.13. 

8!. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(7) (1988); Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764 n.13. 

82. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988); see supra note 10. 
83. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 765 (quoting S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 61 (1983), adopted by H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1133, 98th Congo 1st Sess. 79, 106 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5677). The Report stated that all waste 
management activities were within the purview of the exclusion including: "generation, 
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of waste ...." S. REP. No. 284 at 61. 
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court of the intended exemption. The court quoted extensively 
from a Senate committee report,84 a conference committee report,85 
and EPA statements.86 The Wheelabrator court also quoted from 
post-legislative letters written by senators and a representative87 
which interpreted that Congress did not intend to exempt ash with 
toxic characteristics from regulation as a hazardous waste. The 
court concluded, however, that subsequent interpretations of legis­
lation are not useful in determining congressional intent.88 . Con­
gress' intent at the time it passed section 3001(i), as indicated in 
Senate and Committee reports, was to encourage energy recovery. 
Therefore, the reach of the exclusion must include the facilities that 
recover energy.89 
The district court supported its analysis with the Report of the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works ("Report") 
which accompanied the proposed amendment.90 The Report indi­
cated to the court that since section 3001(i) was a clarification of an 
EPA regulation, Congress was aware of the EPA interpretation 
which included ash in the exemption.91 Congress could have specif­
ically clarified the EPA interpretation with regard to ash. The court 
concluded it would be an unfair reading of the statute to omit ash 
from the "household waste" exclusion without a clearer indication 
from Congress to do SO.92 
. The Report also included the term "generation" in its explana­
tion of the exclusion, although RCRA itself does not.93 Given the 
fact that the legislation is ambiguous on its face, the court found the 
Report's reference to generation probative of whether Congress in­
tended to include generation of waste, such as ash residue, within 
84. S. REp. No. 284, supra note 62, at 61. See infra notes 90-94 and accompany­
ing text for the substance of the Senate Report. 
85. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 765 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1133, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 106 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5677). 
86. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 766-69; see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying 
text. 
87. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 769-70. EDF submitted letters of October, 
1987, from senators and a representative in support of its argument. The court dis­
agreed because the letters were written subsequent to the legislation and were "not 
even the contemporaneous views of the authors, much less of Congress as a whole." Id. 
at 770; see also infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
88. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 769. 
89. [d. at 767. 
90. [d. at 765 (quoting S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1983)); see supra 
note 83. 
91. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764-65. 
92. [d. at 765-66. 
93. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 62, at 61. 
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the "household waste" exemption.94 
The district court gave little deference to the EPA state­
ments,95 regarding them as inconsistent and based on a question­
able interpretation of the statute. The court accorded even less 
weight to the letters submitted by the senators and Representative 
Florio on EDF's behalf. In addition, the court found subsequent 
interpretations by some members of Congress" 'hazardous' to the 
present purpose of statutory construction."96 The court concluded 
that the intent of Congress was clear at the time of the exclusion's 
passage. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with 
the district court that Congress intended to exempt municipal incin­
eration ash from Subtitle C regulation in order to promote the en­
ergy recovery process itself.97 
III. 	 ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC V. CITY OF 
CHICAG098 
The Northwest Waste-to-Energy Facility, owned and operated 
by the City of Chicago, has incinerated residential refuse since 1971. 
The incineration process, in turn, produces bottom ash residue.99 
Between 1981 and 1987, thirty-five ash samples from the facility 
were tested for toxicity. Thirty-two of the samples exceeded toxic­
ity limits as set forth in Subtitle C and EPA regulations. loo In Chi­
cago, the EDF brought suit against the city of Chicago for RCRA 
violations. Chicago conceded that its incinerator's ash was "man­
aged" as non-hazardous waste,lOl but argued that such management 
was appropriate because the ash, even if it exhibited hazardous 
characteristics, was exempt under section 3001(i) of RCRA102 and 
thus subject only to Subtitle D regulation. The EDF contended 
that the City of Chicago violated RCRA by Chicago's disposal of 
hazardous waste in a non-hazardous Michigan landfill.103 The par­
94. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 765. 
95. Id. at 766-69. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for the EPA's 
interpretations of the "household waste" exemption. 
96. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 770; see supra note 87. 
97. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931 
F.2d 211, 213-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). The court also found the 
New York state exclusion consistent with § 3001(i) by the same reasoning. Id. 
98. 948 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992), affd, 985 F.2d 303 
(7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). 
99. Id. at 345-46. 
100. Id. at 346; see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
101. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 345-46. 
102. 42 V.S.c. § 6921(i} (1988); see supra note 10 for the text of the exemption. 
103. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 346. 
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ties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court 
issued a memorandum finding Chicago exempt from Subtitle C reg­
ulation pursuant to the section 3001(i) exclusion.104 However, the 
court denied both motions and ordered further discovery to deter~ 
mine if Chicago was in compliance with section 3001(i). EDF con­
ceded that Chicago was in compliance and Chicago renewed its 
motion for summary judgment which was granted on August 20, 
1990. EDF appealed the granting of summary judgment to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. lOs 
The Seventh Circuit held that municipal solid waste ash was 
subject to Subtitle C regulation as a hazardous waste. The court 
explained that ash which was generated as a result of household 
waste management was subject to Subtitle C regulation if it exhib­
ited hazardous characteristics as defined in EPA regulations.106 
The Chicago court set out the legislative history of section 
3001(i)107 and then chose not to rely on it, basing its opinion on the 
plain language of the statute. lOS The Seventh Circuit found that the 
"definitive statement of the congressional intent" lies in the actual 
words of the statute which it considered the "end product of the 
rough-and-tumble of the political process."l09 After setting out the 
language, purpose, and background of the statute, the court ex­
plained that "[w]hat we have to work with here is a statute subject 





106. Id. at 3S2. 
107. The Chicago and Wheelabrator courts examined the same legislative history, 
which is also set out in the background of RCRA in Section I of this Note. See also 
supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. 
108. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 3SO-S1. The Chicago court quoted Supreme Court Jus­
tice Antonin Scalia in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989). Justice Scalia 
wrote that use of legislative history: 
is neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, con­
sistent and effective application of the statutes of the United States, nor con­
ducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative 
force to each snippet of analysis ... in committee reports that are increasingly 
unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually had in 
mind. 
Id. 
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Sinclair, also spoke of the use of legislative history in 
construing statutes as "a poor guide to legislators' intent because it is written by the 
staff rather than by members of Congress, because it is often losers' history ... , be­
cause it becomes a crutch ... , because it complicates the task of execution and obedi­
ence." In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989). 
109. Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1343. 
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administrative agency."110 
The Seventh Circuit focused on the language of section 3001(i) 
which provides that "[a] resource recovery facility recovering en­
ergy from the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not be 
deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing 
hazardous wastes for the purpose of regulation under this sub­
chapter."lll The court acknowledged that because of the statute's 
ambiguity, legislative history may be probative of congressional in­
tent. However, in this case, the court found that the legislative his­
tory itself was not "explicit" as to Congress' intent to exempt ash. 
On this point the Chicago court expressly disagreed with the Whee­
labrator court.1l2 
In support of its position, the Seventh Circuit relied on the 
post-enactment letter signed by Senators Stafford, Ourenberger, 
Chafee, Burdick, Baucus, Mitchell, and the letter of Representative 
Florio which implied that members of Congress intended manage­
ment and not generation of waste to be the focus of the exemp­
tion.113 The court also relied on Congressman Thomas Luken's 
opening remarks at a 1989 hearing on proposed legislation to regu­
late ash under Subtitle D.114 Congressman Luken indicated in his 
opening statement that Congress did not intend to exempt ash from 
toxicity analysis or from regulation under Subtitle C if the ash 
tested at hazardous, toxic levels.115 The Seventh Circuit considered 
this as further evidence that the Senate Report, relied on by the 
Second Circuit in Wheelabrator, was not as definitive as that court 
deemed it to be.1l6 The Seventh Circuit concluded that generation 
and management are not coextensive terms.1l7 
110.. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 350. 
111. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 10 for the full 
text of the clarification. 
112. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 348. The two sentence dissent of Judge Ripple states 
that he would affirm the district court's decision for the reasons stated in Wheelabrator. 
Id. at 352 (Ripple, J., dissenting). See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for the 
opposite holding of the Wheelabrator court. 
113. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 348. The Senators' letter is reproduced in the opinion 
and indicates that Congress did not intend to exempt the ash from analysis for toxicity. 
Therefore, Congress must have intended that if the ash tested hazardous that it should 
be regulated under RCRA Subtitle C. Id. 
114. Hearings, supra note 60; see supra note 64 for a discussion of the content of 
the hearings. 
115. Hearings, supra note 60; see supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
116. Hearings, supra note 60. 
117. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 351. The court explained that "[s]tatutory construction 
is a holistic endeavor: the only permissible meaning is that which is compatible with the 
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In analyzing the statutory language, the court focused on the 
phrase "or otherwise managing" and the fact that the other terms as 
defined in the statute do not include the concept of "generating" a 
different waste product altogether.118 The court found the "or 
otherwise managing" language of section 3001(i) to be the disposi­
tive language of the statute. According to the court, "[o]r otherwise 
managing" indicated that "generating" a different waste was not 
within the exclusion.119 The court found the words of the statute to 
be specific in that "management" includes only those specific activi­
ties that are listed.120 The statute defines "management" using the 
terms "treatment" and "disposal." Neither definition incorporates 
the term "generation."121 Therefore the court held that "manage­
ment" does not include "generation," that the section 3001(i) exclu­
sion does not apply, and that municipal solid waste ash is subject to 
regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA.122 The court concluded that 
the bottom ash waste product is adifferent waste product because it 
has a completely different chemical and physical composition from 
the trash that began the process.123 The court found it inconsistent 
that the generation of hundreds of tons of hazardous wastes that 
qualify as "characteristic" wastes were intended to be excluded 
from Subtitle C regulation when a stated purpose of RCRA is to 
encourage the careful management of hazardous materials which 
are dangerous to human health.124 
'flesh and bones' of a law, from its overarching purpose down to its individual words." 
Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 351; see supra note 10 for the full text of the exclusion. 
120. See 42 U.S.c. § 6903(3), (6) and (7) (1988); see supra note 78. 
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). The term "gen­
eration" is separately defined as "the act or process of producing hazardous waste." 42 
U.S.c. § 6903(6) (1988). The term "treatment" is defined as: 
any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to 
change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any 
hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste 
non-hazardous, safer for transport, amendable for recovery ... , storage, or 
reduced in volume. Such term includes any activity or processing designed to 
change the physical form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as to 
render it non-hazardous. 
42 U.S.c. § 6903(34) (1988). See also supra note 79 for the definition of "disposal." 
122. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352. 
123. Id. at 351. 
124. Id.; see supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit echoes 
concern over the world-wide struggle with the dangers of illegal hazardous waste trade. 
The continued increase in volume of generated waste combined with a decrease in land­
fill space in developed nations like the United States will only exacerbate the problem 
especially for developing nations where proper disposal methods do not exist and 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 16, 
1992.125 In a Summary Disposition, the Court vacated the Seventh 
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration 
in light of a September 28, 1992 EPA memorandum, once again in­
terpreting the "household waste" exemption. In the memorandum, 
the EPA stated that its regulations intended to exempt ash from 
regulation as a hazardous waste.126 On January 29, 1993, the Sev­
enth Circuit reconsidered the case on remand from the Supreme 
Court.127 The court affirmed its previous holding and held that 
"ash generated in the combustion of municipal waste is subject to 
the regulatory scheme governing hazardous waste set forth in 
[RCRA]," notwithstanding the EPA's conflicting interpretation.128 
Therefore, the Second and Seventh Circuits were still in 
disagreement. 
On June 21, 1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.129 
Arguments were heard on January 19, 1994.130 
where excess waste from developed nations generally ends up. See C. Russell H. 
Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on Hazardous 
Waste, 23 ENVTL L. 141 (1993). Therefore, it seems logically imperative that the United 
States determine what it will or will not consider hazardous waste for disposal purposes. 
Any non-hazardous waste that can be safely disposed of on United States soil can also 
alleviate the amount of waste that may be criminally shipped out of the country in an 
effort to circumvent proper disposal methods for hazardous waste. 
125. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992). 
126. Memorandum ofWilliam K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection 
Agency, dated September 18, 1992, 61 U.S.L.W. 3369 (November 17, 1992). At the 
suggestion of the Bush administration, the Court sidestepped the question of whether 
municipal waste ash should be regulated as a hazardous waste, and sent the case back to 
the Seventh Circuit. The outcome was uncertain because the Seventh Circuit had 
warned the Supreme Court that it was not likely to change its position on EPA defer­
ence and had asked the Supreme Court for full review of the case. Supreme Court 
Remands Major Waste Disposal Case, UPI, November 16, 1992, available in LEXIS 
News Library, UPI file. 
127. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 985 F.2d 303 (7th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). 
128. Id. 
129. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993). 
130. 62 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1993) (No. 19-1639); see also Hazardous 
Waste: U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Review RCRA Application to City Incinerator 
Ash, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 22, 1993, at A118. Whether the 
Clinton administration's change in EPA leadership will have any effect on the Supreme 
Court's analysis remains to be seen. The new EPA head Carol Browner was the former 
secretary of Florida's DEP and an attorney. She has received high praise from environ­
mental groups for her "aggressive, proactive approach to regulation and her vigorous 
enforcement of the law." During confirmation hearings, Browner stated that the "EPA 
can ease the burden on the business community without compromising the environ­
ment." Theodore L. Garrett, The Changing Environmental Guard at EPA: What to 
Expect, SONREEL NEWS, May-June 1993, at 2. 




The disagreement in statutory construction that has arisen be­
tween the Second and Seventh Circuits over the interpretation of 
an environmental statute is not unique. Courts have long struggled 
with the use of legislative history in statutory construction. Re­
cently, the pre-World War Two textualist philosophies have re­
emerged, creating renewed vigor in the oldest of controversies con­
cerning the benefits and drawbacks of using legislative history in 
statutory construction. The Wheelabrator and the Chicago courts 
reached opposite holdings due to the method chosen to construe 
the statute.131 The Wheelabrator court, finding the statutory lan­
guage ambiguous, utilized what it thought to be the most authorita­
tive legislative history, rejected what it thought to be the least 
authoritative history and held that the municipal bottom ash was 
part of the "household waste" exemption.132 The Chicago court's 
analysis included consideration of non-authoritative post-legislative 
history. The post-legislative history the court considered was at 
odds with the pre-legislative history. As a result, the Seventh Cir­
cuit rejected all the legislative history as confusing and ultimately 
resorted to the textual or literal approach to statutory construc­
tion.133 The Chicago court then held that the municipal bottom ash 
that is toxic should be regulated as a hazardous waste.134 
The Second and Seventh Circuits' decisions represent two dis­
tinct approaches to statutory construction. The Wheelabrator 
court's approach used authoritative legislative history to glean con­
gressional intent.135 The Chicago court used a "plain meaning" ap­
131. The basic canons of statutory construction are: 1. Plain language; 2. Give 
effect to the entire statute; 3. Read the text in its contemporary context; 4. If ambiguity 
exists, look to legislative history; and 5. Provide a reasonable interpretation avoiding 
absurd results. For a thoroughly enjoyable analysis of these basic concepts, see Justice 
John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1373 (1992). 
132. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931 
F.2d 211, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); see supra notes 74-97. 
133. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352; see supra notes 107-24. 
134. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 352. The Chicago court, while textually construing the 
statute, also looked at statistics which indicated that hundreds of tons of ash were pro­
duced annually by the incineration process. Id. As a matter of policy, the court con­
cluded Congress could not have meant hundreds of tons of a chemically and physically 
different composition than that which entered the incineator to be "household waste." 
Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 131 and accompanying text for an explanation of the canons 
of statutory construction which include the use of legislative history if the language of a 
statute is ambiguous. 
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proach which is necessary where the legislative history is unclear as 
to congressional intent.136 These extremes have fostered a multi­
tude of intermediate theories ranging from the "soft" plain meaning 
rule137 to formalism,138 historicism139 and imaginative reconstruc­
tion.140 The canons of statutory construction themselves include re­
course to legislative history if the statute's language is ambiguous 
and the legislative intent is clear,141 The Wheelabrator and Chicago 
courts agreed that legislative history could be useful in determining 
congressional intent if the legislative history is clear. However, the 
Chicago and Wheelabrator courts parted company on what legisla­
tive history is useful in statutory construction. The Wheelabrator 
court found the legislative intent clear. The Chicago court chose 
not to consider any legislative history because the court found the 
legislative intent unclear. This resulted in the court's literal con­
struction of the statute. 
An analysis of the Supreme Court's views on the use of legisla­
tive history in statutory construction suggests that the Supreme 
Court supports the use of legislative history within certain defined 
parameters. The Wheelabrator court's construction of the statute is 
consistent with these parameters. 
A. Plain Meaning Approach 
According to the Supreme Court, if the language of a statute is 
clear, a court cannot replace that language with "unenacted legisla­
tive intent."142 The Supreme Court has indicated that a court 
136. This has been referred to as the "textualist" approach. See Recent Case, 
Statutory Construction-Drafting Errors-D. C. Circuit Declares section 92 of the Na­
tional Bank Act Invalid-Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 
955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992),105 HARV. L. REV. 2116 (1992) (suggesting that scrivener 
or inadvertent errors by Congress should be corrected by the judiciary even though 
appearing to forego the rigid textual approach to statutory construction). Subse­
quently, Independent Insurance Agents was reversed on other grounds by U.S. Nat. 
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993). 
137. See infra text accompanying note 156 for the definition of the soft plain 
meaning rule. 
138. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of the for­
malist attitude toward use of legislative history in statutory construction. 
139. See infra text accompanying note 150 for an explanation of the historicist 
approach to the use of legislative history in statutory construction. 
140. See Eskridge, infra note 145 at 630-36. 
141. See Stevens, supra note 131. 
142. INS v. Cardoza-Fonsezca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
The Supreme Court has been influenced in its past two terms by Justice Scalia's strict 
textual approach to statutory construction. But the Court has not relinquished the 
traditional approaches, including use of legislative history where the language of a stat­
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should begin statutory analysis with what the statute actually 
says.143 Adhering to a statute's literal meaning lends credence to 
and respect for the institutions of bicameralism and separation of 
powers because it limits the judiciary to the statute's words. l44 Lit­
eralism, or as more recently labeled, "textualism," also supports the 
"principal rationale of congressional discipline."145 Literalism al­
lows a statute to be articulated from its four corners.t46 In addition, 
literalism promotes precision and consistency while preventing un­
certainty and pliability of statutory language.147 
Textualists posit that once the plain meaning of a statute has 
been established, the intent of the statute should only be gleaned 
from further examination of the statute itself, official authoritative 
interpretations of other provisions of the statute, and canons of 
statutory construction. l48 Textualists, in the three different theoret­
ical frameworks of realism, historicism, and formalism, criticize the 
use of legislative history in statutory construction. Realists contend 
that legislative history is not representative of anyone's intent as far 
as how the current issue should be decided. They further assert that 
judges have no way of really knowing what Congress would do if 
confronted directly with the problem facing the court. When using 
legislative history, a court merely guesses what Congress would do 
if it were solving the instant issue.149 
Historicists criticize the use of legislative history in statutory 
construction because they argue that it is impossible to recreate a 
past event and discern another's intent at the exact moment of the 
past event. Current interpretation of past events is always clouded 
by current social attitudes and contemporaneous views of the facts, 
the role of the judiciary, and by society's expectations at any time in 
history.150 
Formalists argue that use of legislative history does a disservice 
ute is ambiguous. See Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory 
and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L. J. 160. 
143. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981). 
144. See Recent Case, supra note 136, at 2116. 
145. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). 
Professor Eskridge presents an exhaustive analysis and critique of Justice Scalia's textu­
alist approach to statutory construction. 
146. Id. at 643. 
147. See Recent Case, supra note 136, at 2119. Uncertainty and pliability of stat­
utory language have been major criticisms of the use of legislative history in statutory 
construction. Id. 
148. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. 
149. See Eskridge, supra note 145, at 643. 
150. Id. at 644-45. 
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to our democratic form of government.15l Formalists see unelected 
judges, without constraints, as usurping the role of lawmakers if 
they can interpret language from any source and replace the text of 
a statute with their own interpretation of it.152 
Most recently, however, formalism embraces the less severe 
position that legislative history may be invoked cautiously, yet still 
avoided where possible.153 Recent formalism is the apparent the­
ory behind the Chicago court's approach to statutory construction. 
Although the Supreme Court has moved toward a textualist 
position in recent years, it has never suggested that there is no place 
for legislative history in statutory construction.154 The Court has 
repeatedly exhibited a tendency to adhere to the traditional "soft" 
plain meaning rule.155 The "soft" plain meaning rule allows the use 
of legislative history as the best evidence of the purpose of the stat­
ute where the statutory language is ambiguous or in direct conflict 
with the intentions of the drafters.156 The "soft" plain meaning rule 
has been manipulated by many courts so that virtually any docu­
ment which explains, refers to or is impliedly relevant to the statute 
at issue can be used to construe the statute and to determine con­
gressional intent.157 
The Supreme Court has recognized that statutory construction 
problems arise for a court when a statute cannot be construed liter­
ally due to its ambiguous language. The Supreme Court has also 
identified typical solutions to basic statutory construction problems. 
First, if the literal interpretation of the statute results in a direct 
conflict with clear congressional intent, the court would be over­
reaching to not consider legislative history.158 Second, where literal 
interpretation of the statute produces "absurd results," judges must 
find a rational construction of the statute using, among other things, 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 656. 
154. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1986) (stating the Court's 
disregard of agency interpretation where conflicting); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (explaining that if literal construction of a statute would be at 
odds with the intentions of the drafters, the drafters' intentions are controlling); Con­
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980). 
155. See Eskridge, supra note 145, at 626·30. 
156. Id. at 626. 
157. See supra note 154. 
158. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (explaining 
that if literal construction of a statute would be at odds with the intentions of the draft­
ers, the drafters' intentions are controlling). See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
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the statute's legislative history.159 Third, if the language of a statute 
is ambiguous, it cannot be interpreted literally. Therefore, courts 
must look to legislative history in an attempt to clear up the ambi­
guity.160 Although myriad legislative materials are referred to by 
courts as legislative history, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
most should be afforded little weight in statutory construction.161 
Supreme Court cases suggest a hierarchy of legislative history au­
thority to be used in statutory construction.162 
B. Most Authoritative Legislative History 
The Supreme Court has recognized the most authoritative 
source of congressional intent to be committee reports.163 Commit­
tee reports allow clear insight into the intent of those who drafted 
the statute's language. Conference committee reports are even 
more probative of the intent of both the Senate and the House on a 
particular bill. The conference committee knows virtually every­
thing there is to know about the bill before it is voted on and rec­
ommended to Congress or killed in committee.l64 The court may 
also give significant weight to rejected proposals for legislation if 
the rejection occurred in committee before enactment of the subse­
quently accepted version of the statute. The Court has found re­
jected language of an earlier proposal evidence of what Congress 
discarded as possible statutory language.165 
Sponsor statements are also given substantial weight by the 
Supreme Court in referring to legislative intent when construing a 
statute. Sponsors are more likely than any other congressional 
member to know the legislation's details.166 Where a sponsor state­
159. See Stevens, supra note 131, at 1383. 
160. [d. 
161. See infra notes 162-86 and accompanying text. 
162. See Eskridge supra note 145 at 642-46 for a thorough discussion of a pro­
posed hierarchy of legislative authority and explanation of the proposed weight af­
forded to each. 
163. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 
43-44 n.7 (1986) (stating committee reports are the "authoritative source for legislative 
intent"); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (stating the most authoritative 
source for finding the legislature's intent lies in the committee reports on the bill). 
164. See Eskridge, supra note 145, at 621; Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
122-25 (1987); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974); S & E 
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972). 
165. Tanner, 343 U.S. at 122-25. 
166. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 716 (1989) (Civil 
Rights Act of 1966, Sen. Trumbull and Rep. Wilson); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 
326, 333-34 (1988) (Speedy Trial Act, Rep. Cohen). 
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ment is ambiguous, the Court also has expressed a willingness to 
look at floor and hearing colloquy.167 
C. Least Authoritative Legislative History 
Although a major tenet of the textualist rationale is to give 
substantial deference to administrative agency interpretation,168 in 
a number of cases the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that 
conflicting administrative agency interpretations of a statute169 and 
subsequent legislative history interpreting the statute should be af­
forded little, if any, weight in statutory construction.17D In fact, the 
Court has stated that "where the question is one of specific applica­
tion of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency 
administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing 
court's function is limited."I71 However, where an agency position 
on an issue is equivocal, the courts of appeals have been divided 
with respect to the deference owed to the agency interpretation.l72 
167. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 553-54 (1987) (refus­
ing to rely on an ambiguous sponsor statement when statutory definitions and state­
ments of other legislators differed). 
168. See Russell L. Weaver, Evaluating Regulation Interpretations: Individual 
Statements, 80 Ky. L. J. 987 (1991-92) for a background discussion of deference princi­
ples; see also Stever, infra note 172. 
169. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1986) and cases cited 
therein (rejecting agency interpretation where there is "inconsistency of the positions 
the [EPA] has take.n through the years."). 
170. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 
F. Supp. 758, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting from Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,117 (1980) ("the views of a subsequent Congress form 
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one" (citation omitted». 
171. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). 
172. See Donald W. Stever, Jr., Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal 
Environmental, Health and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application 
of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 35 (1983) for an in depth analysis of deference to 
agency interpretation of statutes. Professor Stever contrasted two cases in which the 
courts were faced with an inconsistent EPA position on the meaning of a statute. Id. at 
62-67. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the EPA 
refused to place hydroelectric dams under the permit requirement of the Clean Water 
Act even though it was argued that dams, by changing the physical and chemical 
properties of the stream water, harmed wildlife in similar ways as pollutants. Because 
the EPA had sharply disagreed internally on the issue, the district court interpreted the 
statute itself, ascertained congressional intent and ordered the dams brought within the 
permit requirement. [d. The court of appeals reversed, stating that if the issue is one of 
policy implications, great deference should be afforded the agency position. Id. at 169. 
In a second case, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 
718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun­
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), an EPA regulation was challenged based on the EPA's 
interpretation of the term "stationary source" as it appeared in Part D of the 1977 
amendments to the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. 
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The Supreme Court has set out guidelines regarding the 
amount of deference which should be given to an agency interpreta­
tion of a statute. If an agency interpretation of a statute is to be 
afforded weight in statutory construction, the interpretation must 
be "rational and consistent with the statute."173 The Supreme 
Court will consider several factors in determining what is "rational 
and consistent with the statute."174 First, the Court will ask 
whether Congress addressed the issue. If it did, the Court may ac­
cede to Congress if Congress used explicit language which became 
the agency regulation.175 If not, the Court will consider whether the 
agency resolved the issue. If the agency resolved the issue, the 
Court must give deference to the agency interpretation if the 
agency interpretation is a rational and consistent construction of 
the statuteP6 Finally, the Court will consider whether Congress 
expressly authorized the agency to promulgate the regulation that is 
the subject of the interpretation. If such power was authorized, the 
agency interpretation may be controlling unless it is arbitrary, capri­
cious, or directly contradicts the statuteP7 
In addition, the Court has indicated that a post enactment pro­
nouncement of the entire legislature may be afforded significant 
weight in statutory construction.178 In contrast, little weight should 
be afforded to subsequent remarks, pronouncements, or reports of 
§§ 7470-7479 (1988), which imposes more stringent controls under the "stationary 
source" term than Part D of the Act and which initially gave rise to the controversy in 
the case. Although Part D of the Act did not define the term, the EPA defined it for 
Part D purposes. The Part D definition created a conflict with the term "major emitting 
facility" which appeared to be an identical concept, that is, defining the "thing that is to 
be regulated." See Stever at 66, n.I71. However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
had previously decided that the two terms were not identical and a dual definition of a 
term for Part C and D purposes would constitute "an exercise of statutory interpreta­
tion" on the EPA's part. The EPA later amended its position and made the two defini­
tions identical by regulation. When the court in Natural Resources Defense Council was 
faced with this inconsistent EPA position, the court gave no deference to the agency at 
all. Natural Resources, 685 F.2d at 726. Professor Stever concluded that the court's 
inconsistent application of deference to the agency is due to the lack of criteria for 
according deference. Stever, at 67. 
173. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 
112, 123 (1987). 
174. Id. 
175. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
176. Id. at 843. 
177. Id. at 843-44. 
178. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 840, 847 (1991); see infra note 180 
and accompanying text. 
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individuals or groupS.179 For example, where Congress has passed a 
statute to explain an earlier statute, the post-enacted statute can be 
given significant weight in construing the earlier law.180 Con­
versely, a single senator or representative's opinion of what statu­
tory language means, spoken or written after the passage of the 
statute, should be given little or no weight in construing the 
statute.181 
Furthermore, the Court has considered a post-enactment pro­
nouncement of a legislative committee with respect to previously 
enacted legislation to be significant. . If the committee pro­
nouncement was made within five years of the enacted legislation 
and the committee is the very one which reported the bill that be­
came the law, significant weight may be afforded to the committee 
pronouncement.182 
The Supreme Court affords little, if any weight, to post-enact­
ment pronouncements of individual legislators in statutory con­
struction. Such pronouncements include opinions of legislators, 
even in floor debate on proposed legislation following an enact­
ment,183 or interpretations of a group of legislators attempting to 
promote later legislation. l84 The Court has even held that a sena­
tor's subsequent correction of his own error during floor debate is 
179. Gozlon-Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 847; see infra note 180 and cases cited therein. 
180. See Gozlon-Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 847 (stating that the view of a later Con­
gress, while not definitive of intent of an earlier enactment, has persuasive value); see 
also, Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp., v. Shell 
Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 576 (1980) (stating that views of a subsequent Congress cannot 
override the enacting legislature but are entitled to significant weight if the enacting 
legislature is obscure). 
181. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
182. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942). In Sioux 
Tribe, the issue was whether the General Allotment Act of 1887, by including Indian 
reservations that had been authorized by executive order, gives Indians located on them 
the same right of title as the Indians on reservations authorized by statute or treaty. 
The Court relied on an 1892 report of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. The 
report, in addressing whether to abolish a certain Indian reservation, stated that Indian 
reservation residents, under executive order, did not enjoy the same title rights. The 
Supreme Court found the committee statement "virtually conclusive as to the signifi­
cance of the act." Id. at 329-30; see also Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980) 
(giving significant weight to a directive issued one year later from the Senate Commit­
tee that the Secretary of the Interior should proceed on the patentability of the shale oil 
issue under the savings clause which was the intent of the previous legislation). 
183. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
184. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962) (concluding that the interpre­
tation of a previous statute by a group of congressmen seeking to promote later legisla­
tion should be given no weight in construing the earlier statute). 
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLUSION 175 

afforded no weight in statutory construction.18S 
These developed parameters of the Court allow lower courts to 
gauge their use of legislative history when construing a statute to 
determine congressional intent. Based on these parameters, the 
Supreme Court has moved toward the conclusion that, as the 
Wheelabrator court put it, subsequent legislative history forms a 
"hazardous basis for inferring intent."186 
D. 	 Application of Supreme Court Views to the Wheelabrator 
and City of Chicago Cases 
Both the Second Circuit in Wheelabrator and the Seventh Cir­
cuit in Chicago agreed that the statutory language of section 3001(i) 
is ambiguous. Both courts also agreed that legislative history is use­
ful in statutory construction where the language of the statute is 
ambiguous and the legislative history is clear.187 The courts dis­
agreed, however, as to what legislative history to consider in deter­
mining whether the legislative history of section 3001(i) is clear. 
The Wheelabrator court relied primarily on the Senate Report 
accompanying section 3001(i). The court further relied on the 
EPA's pre-enactment interpretation of its own household waste ex­
clusion.188 As a result of this reliance, the court concluded that bot­
tom ash was intended to be exempt from Subtitle C regulation. The 
court disregarded, as irrelevant and non-authoritative, the post-en­
actment EPA interpretations of the statute,189 individual legislators' 
post-legislation interpretations,l90 and post-enactment proposed 
legislation language,191 in deciding that ash was exempt from haz­
ardous waste regulation. 
The Chicago court found at first blush that the Senate Report 
indicated that "generation" of ash was included in the original ex­
emption.l92 However, after considering the Senate Report, all of 
185. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (noting such a "belated 
correction is not probative"). 
186. 	 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 
F. Supp. 758,770 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980) (stating that statements by an individuallegisla­
tor in subsequent hearings and subsequent committee report were not entitled to much 
weight)), affd, 931 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991). 
187. 	 Id. at 765-66; see supra notes 84-97. 
188. 	 See supra note 58. 
189. 	 Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. 766-69; see supra notes 58-63. 
190. 	 See supra note 113. 
191. 	 See Hearings, supra note 60. 
192. 	 See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text for the Seventh Circuit's 
176 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:149 
the conflicting EPA interpretations (both authoritative and non-au­
thoritative), post-enactment interpretations, and proposed legisla­
tion language, the Seventh Circuit was l.eft confused as to legislative 
intent.193 As a result, the court was forced to rely on a textual con­
struction of the statute. In so doing, the Chicago court found the 
term "management" dispositive because the term "generation" was 
not used in the actual language of the statute. The court inter­
preted "management" from a policy standpoint.194 The court found 
that the exemption's purpose is to "manage" household wastes and 
that a stated purpose of RCRA is to encourage the careful manage­
ment of hazardous wastes that are dangerous to human health.195 
The court then concluded that Congress could not have meant the 
"generation"of hundreds of tons of hazardous ash, dangerous to 
human health, to be included within the exemption. 
The Seventh Circuit should not have considered all of section 
3001(i)'s legislative history and would not have been left confused if 
it had considered the Supreme Court's rules of statutory construc­
tion. The Supreme Court has indicated that pre-enactment inter­
pretations or explanations of statutory language are most 
authoritative in construing a statute. The court need not have re­
jected all legislative history on the matter and would not have been 
confused by what appeared to be a "waffling" legislative history if 
the court had considered only the Senate Report and the pre-enact­
ment interpretation of the bill.196 These two authoritative sources 
for use in construing section 3001(i) should have clarified the ex­
emption's language for the court. The Seventh Circuit's approach 
did not comport with the Supreme Court's parameters for statutory 
construction because the Seventh Circuit did not disregard non-au­
analysis of the terms "generation," which is not specifically used in section 3001(i), and 
"management. " 
193. Id. 
194. See supra notes 16 and 134 for some discussion of policy considerations that 
are inherent in all hazardous waste issues. This Note does not address the policy argu­
ments that could be made on either side of the issue. Rather, this Note focuses on the 
Second and Seventh Circuits' methods of statutory construction and whether the courts 
adhered to the Supreme Court's parameters for using legislative history in statutory 
construction. See Sale, supra note 24, at 437-39, for further discussion of the interpreta­
tion of § 3001(i) regarding the use of the terms "managment" and "generation" as pre­
and post-Combustion regulation terms. The author concludes that § 3001(i) must apply 
both pre- and post-Combustion processes so that the language of § 3001(i) has meaning 
and so that municipal incineration is encouraged. Id. 
195. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
196. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 345, 350 (7th 
Cir.1991). See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text for the textual analysis of the 
court. 
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thoritative legislative history. The Seventh Circuit's consideration 
of conflicting EPA positions on the issue, post-enactment legisla­
tors' interpretations and post-enactment proposed legislation was in 
conflict with the Supreme Court guidelines which categorize these 
pieces of legislative history as the least authoritative in statutory 
construction. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that EPA 
interpretations which are inconsistent should be given little or no 
weight.197 Likewise, post-enactment pronouncements of intent, un­
less issued by the entire Congress, are of little weight in construing 
a statute.198 This discounts the Seventh Circuit's consideration of 
the senators' and Representative Florio's letters which the court 
partially relied on in finding that the legislative history of section 
3001(i) was unclear.199 If the Supreme Court's legislative history 
guidelines were used appropriately, the Second and Seventh Cir­
cuits could have arrived at a consistent and predictable result, even 
in this circumstance of muddled statutory intent. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that committee reports, 
such as the Senate Committee Report on section 3001(i), are to be 
given significant weight as the most authoritative legislative history 
for use in statutory construction.2OO Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has held that post-enactment pronouncements and interpre­
tations of legislation are to be afforded little, if any, weight in statu­
tory construction.201 The Wheelabrator court found that post­
enactment EPA interpretations of the statute,z02 individual legisla­
tor's letters203 and post-enactment proposed legislation that had 
failed,z04 all which indicated that ash should not be exempt from 
regulation as a hazardous waste, were irrelevant and non-authorita­
197. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 768-69; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 446 n.30 (1986). It could be argued that the EPA is the only vehicle with which 
Congress can specify exact requirements of its overall legislation, in the name of effi­
ciency and expediency, in passing any complex environmental law which will constantly 
need refining and redefining of its major policy provisions. 
198. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) (stating the views of some 
members of Congress "as to the construction of a statute adopted years before by an­
other Congress have very little, if any significance"); United States v. United Mine 
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (refusing to give any weight to individual legislator's pro­
nouncements in 1947 concerning the meaning of a statute passed in 1932). The Court 
pointed out, however, that more weight could be given if a legislator had been a mem­
ber of the very committee that had recommended passage of the bill. [d. 
199. Chicago, 948 F.2d at 348. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 180-85. 
202. See supra notes 58-63. 
203. See supra note 113. 
204. See supra note 64. 
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tive for purposes of statutory construction due to the "post-enact­
ment" timing of those pieces of legislative history.205 The Second 
Circuit's reasoning comports closely with the Supreme Court pa­
rameters for use of legislative history in statutory construction.206 
Consequently, the Second Circuit's conclusion that ash was in­
tended to be exempted from regulation as a hazardous waste by 
section 3001(i) is quite compelling. 
First, the Wheelabrator court utilized the canons of statutory 
construction reasonably in its analysis.207 In order to give full effect 
to the statute's purpose, the Wheelabrator court recognized that 
RCRA is an "entire scheme of legislation."208 The court reconciled 
the three purposes of RCRA to regulate and manage both hazard­
ous and non-hazardous solid wastes while protecting human health 
and promoting conservation through energy recovery.209 The court 
realized that regulating ash as a hazardous waste would, in effect, 
emasculate municipalities' attempts to promote incineration which 
is regarded by Congress as an important step in achieving conserva­
tion through energy recovery.2l0 
The Wheelabrator court also reasonably construed RCRA as a 
whole.2ll The court acknowledged that proper deference is given 
to an EPA regulation when that regulation is internally consistent 
with the scheme of RCRA as a whole. Such was not the case in 
Wheelabrator, however, because the EPA interpretations were in­
consistent. Although RCRA mandates regulation and although the 
regulations are express directives, the purpose of the regulations is 
to make the legislation clear and operative.212 The court found that 
shifts in the EPA position between 1980 and 1987 regarding the ex­
clusion of bottom ash from hazardous waste regulation could not 
allow RCRA to operate effectively.213 Therefore, the court inter­
preted the statute in light of the Supreme Court parameter afford­
ing less agency deference when there are conflicts with a previous 
205. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 769-70. 
206. See supra notes 131-86 and accompanying text. 
207. See Stevens, supra note 131, for a description of the basic canons of statutory 
construction. 
208. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 767; 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988); see supra note 1 
and accompanying text. 
209. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988). 
210. Wheelabrator,725 F. Supp. at 768. 
211. See Stevens, supra note 131. 
212. See supra notes 168-77 for the Supreme Court parameters for using agency 
interpretations of its own regulations in statutory construction. 
213. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 767; see supra notes 56-63. 
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interpretation, if the court chooses to consider it at all.214 The Sec­
ond Circuit chose to consider only the EPA's pre-enactment inter­
pretation in the bill's Preamble, as the EPA interpretation of the 
language in the bill.215 This consideration of the Preamble com­
ported with the Supreme Court parameter that pre-legislative pre­
ambles and reports are among the most authoritative for purposes 
of using legislative history in statutory construction.216 The Pream­
ble of section 3001(i) accompanied the Senate Report into Con­
gress before it voted on the bill. The Wheelabrator court concluded 
that Congress intended the Preamble interpretation to be the intent 
of the statutory language as passed.217 Because it disregarded non­
authoritative legislative history, and considered the most authorita­
tive history, the Wheelabrator court seems to have arrived at the 
more compelling conclusion. 
In using Supreme Court parameters for use of legislative his­
tory to determine the congressional intent of section 3001(i), only 
pre-legislative agency interpretation and the Senate Report accom­
panying the exemption should have been afforded weight.218 The 
Senate Report and the pre-legislative agency interpretation both in­
dicated that municipal bottom ash is part of the "household waste" 
stream and therefore excluded from regulation as a hazardous 
waste under section 3001(i).219 From an analysis of Supreme Court 
directives and consideration of appropriate legislative history, it ap­
pears quite clear that ash falls within section 3001(i) and should be 
excluded from regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA. 
CONCLUSION 
The Wheelabrator court chose to sift through all of the avail­
able legislative history and to extract that which should have been 
214. See Stever, supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
215. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 766-69. See supra notes 84-90 and accompany­
ing text. 
216. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 770; see also supra note 163. 
217. Wheelabrator, 725 F. Supp. at 764; see also supra notes 90-92 and accompa­
nying text. Common sense allows the inference that Congress' inadvertence or even 
outright mistakes have resulted, on occasion, in less than crystal clear legislation. In 
thjs case, the term "generation" is expressly included in the Senate Report accompany­
ing the 1984 household waste exclusion clarification. It is reasonable to infer that what 
the EPA said to clarify the previous ambiguity in the statute language was what Con­
gress intended, although inadvertently Congress did not change the terms "manage­
ment" and "generation." Rather, as the Wheelabrator court put it, they are 
"coterminous." Id. 
218. See supra notes 162-166. 
219. See supra notes 162-166. 
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afforded weight in construing section 3001(i). The court then ig­
nored the irrelevant history and gave the authoritative history 
proper weight in construing congressional intent. 
Applying settled principles of what is appropriate and authori­
tative legislative history for consideration in statutory construction 
allows the courts to sift through the irrelevant and focus on the rele­
vant authority. The Wheelabrator court ably coordinated the legis­
lative and judicial branch functions of making the law and 
interpreting it by affording proper weight to authoritative legisla­
tive history in construing RCRA's section 3001(i) "Household 
Waste" exemption to exempt municipal ash from hazardous waste 
regulation. Until Congress can be regarded as infallible, it will 
make errors in language and it will create ambiguous terms in legis­
lation. The use of legislative history to discern true congressional 
intent is better than the educated guesses of the courts. Only Con­
gress, through additional legislation, can change the scope of the 
language of a statute to reflect a new or different intent. The 
Supreme Court has provided guidelines for the use of legislative 
history in statutory construction which the courts should use. It is 
Congress' task to notice an unintended judicial construction of a 
statute and to rectify congressional error or ambiguity with legisla­
tive action. 
Jane Ellen Warner 
